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Although  many  contemporary  studies  of agriculture  associate  larger  properties  with  higher  relative  pro-
ductivity,  this  assumption  has  limited  relevancy  for the analysis  of  situations  in  which  property  owners
proﬁt  more  from  large-scale  property  accumulation  itself  rather  than  any  superiority  in  exploitation
opportunities  offered  by  increased  size.  In Brazil,  the  efﬁciency-of-scale  paradigm  has  been  used  to  crit-eywords:
razil
gricultural policies
and  monopoly
roductivity
ocio-environmental impacts
icize  peasant  agriculture  as  unproductive  and  hide  contradictions  deriving  from  land  concentration.  As
this  paper  argues,  however,  small-scale  agriculture  is actually  responsible  for  most  of  Brazil’s  food  pro-
duction,  rural  employment  and  agricultural  income.  The  paper  utilizes  a land governance  perspective  to
analyze  the  implementation  of  structural  reforms  aimed  at turning  back the  land  monopolization  tide
as  well  as  efforts  to  weaken  long-standing  legal  principles  that  socially  condition  individual  property
“rights”  in Brazil.
© 20ntroduction
Perhaps the scale of worldwide urbanization has created too
reat a physical distance and psychological separation between
ife in the city and life in the countryside for most people to com-
rehend the realities of agriculture and know much about the
roduction of the food that sustains them. In any event, debates
ver land use policies almost always take the form of secondary
atter. Moreover, the pre-eminence of cities contributes toward
einforcing territorial hierarchy in favor of a correlation between
emographic density and political power that reproduces this sense
f territorial order within society. Thus, town and country are
ommonly perceived to be distinct and dissociated based on a quan-
itative population hierarchy.
Such a dichotomy is unjustiﬁed given the origin and destiny of
he resources involved and consequent interdependency of these
paces. In both urban and rural spaces, the logic of capitalist accu-
ulation produces concentration and dispersion, whose intensitynd asymmetry are explained by the nature of a given country’s
nternal power relations. The objective of this essay is to demon-
trate how this is made manifest in Brazil, a eminently urbanized
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country, but one profoundly marked by the hegemony of an oli-
garchy rooted in landed property (Martins, 1994). It argues that the
very density of urban settings, a density that favors the generation
of value, is sustained by goods originating in the countryside, which
are then converted into merchandize in the city through work. This
is nothing more than what Marx (1996) long ago observed when
noting that all wealth has its origins in land and labor.
The  focus of our analysis is on the land part of this equation. Of
particular interest are the mechanisms and implications of the pri-
vate appropriation of land, an irreproducible good that determines
the dynamics of wealth formation in society, which is why criteria
for access to land and its division are of fundamental importance.
Brazil cannot but be taken as an example of this process. Despite
elevated rates of urbanization and the relative weight of its urban-
industrial economy, Brazil takes its place on the world stage as one
of the world’s leading producers and exporters of agricultural goods
and, simultaneously, as holder of the largest tropical patrimony
on earth. This biologically diverse environment also contributes
enormously to the renovation of global water and air supplies and
the regulation of the earth’s climate. These two factors make it
impossible to separate the environmental and agrarian questions,
especially given the fact that these precious resources are managed
more to satisfy the whims  of private property owners than to serve
the common good (Oliveira, 2010).
These coordinates orient this study’s approach to the conﬂict
Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.of interests that infuse the question of land governance in Brazil.
When a person or ﬁrm privately appropriates land, especially large
tracts of environmentally sensitive land like that in Brazil, the pro-
prietor’s will comes into conﬂict with “goodwill” as production
cense.
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emands compete with preservation needs and the owner’s right
isputes with society’s right to clean water, clean air, genetic diver-
ity, and so many other common goods linked to land. A bourgeois
nstitution, property generates beneﬁts that its owner expects to
njoy in return for the labor thereupon expended (Locke, 2007).
his fundamental relationship between land and labor is the seed
hat gives rise to the question of property’s social function, a point
eceiving special attention hereafter, given both its prominent place
n Brazilian law and the state’s neglect of it. Convinced that land
oncentration represents a class alliance that works to weakens
his basic principle of the bourgeois order and is therefore capable
f resurrecting the concept of absolute right, our critique presumes
hat a state governed by the rule of law must, in the name of the
ocial contract, take seriously at all times the land’s social function.
he better established the contract, the more vigorous a country’s
aws will be in regards to land use and environmental concerns,
essening the chances proprietors have to freely exploit and abuse
ssential human and natural resources, thereby preventing them
rom jeopardizing the commonwealth.
As such restrictions occur in particular political contexts, how-
ver, their effectiveness tends to be controlled more by hegemony
han the righteousness of an individual complaint. For this reason,
he article investigates the way in which the territorial composi-
ion of a given place both reﬂects and perpetuates hegemonies that
eproduce and expand a grossly unequal land tenure system.
The  contradictions of this geography are many. In Brazil, the
ontemporary struggle for land highlights these contradictions. It
s a struggle protagonized by peasants and fought essentially in
ural spaces (Welch, 2004), where their resistance to accumulation
y dispossession (Harvey, 2003) is historic. In the meantime, the
andlords, without ignoring an opportunity for aggression in the
ountryside, generally focus their activities on spaces they have
ong dominated, those of the state apparatus. In the realm of pub-
ic policy, Brazilian peasant organization have tried increasingly to
nﬂuence the political sphere while landlords have used their lob-
ies to manipulate the executive, legislative and judiciary branches
o attack the peasantry and block the implementation of legal
estrictions on the autonomy of agribusiness/latifundia. The rural-
stas have worked within the state to defend landlords against the
ew initiatives that have arisen as a consequence of peasant mobi-
ization, as well as those stemming from past struggles that suffered
rom disuse due to the rural oligarchy’s interventions. Interpreting
hese disputes as expressions of territorial conﬂict, the essay also
ighlights the achievements of peasants as manifest in the creation
f agrarian reform settlements. Between 1985 and 2002, the period
hat coincides with the cycle of conservative civilian governments,
81,657 families were settled (NERA, 2011).
While these peasant territorial advances fall far short of con-
tituting an agrarian transformation, they point to another para-
oxical feature of Brazil’s agrarian question: the unparalleled pro-
uctive efﬁciency of peasant agriculture. As shown below, despite
umerous obstacles and little land, Brazilian peasants have been
ery productive. In fact, when the compared to the largest estates,
here intensive commodity crops as well as cattle grazing predom-
nate, small family farms are far more efﬁcient in their use of the
and. The celebrated vitality that has secured for Brazil a prominent
osition in global commodity markets needs to be confronted not
nly from the perspective of its environmental and social impacts
Oliveira, 2003), but also from the perspective of productivity.
Thus,  this article deconstructs at least one of the principal nar-
atives used in the public presentation of Brazilian agribusiness –
he assumption that greater size automatically means greater efﬁ-
iency. Our investigation of the productivity of large estates ﬁnds
nswers not in the celebrated use of technology or supposedly
dvanced management, but in privileges wrested from the state,
uch as access to cheap credit and abundant fertile land, bothy 36 (2014) 134– 144 135
placed  at the disposal of landlords by a governmental apparatus
these same beneﬁciaries either control or greatly inﬂuence. The
consequent expansion of the Brazil’s agricultural frontier, which
continues advancing on biomes without even minimal environ-
mental oversight, depredates further Brazil’s natural patrimony.
Consequently, the article also confronts the agribusiness narra-
tive that deforestation is a small price to pay for producing the
foodstuffs that will beneﬁt all of society.
Understanding how all this works is not easy. For example, it
requires a spatiotemporal correlation between the increase of agri-
cultural exports and deforestation to determine if it creating new
farmland is really what attracts investors to the “agricultural fron-
tier.” While this goal may  play a role, what seems to drive these
acquisitions is a combination of factors, including lower taxes on
capital and opportunities to proﬁt from the extraction and sale of
hardwoods and the deployment of herds of cattle. Beef requires
lower investments than crops, while assuring proﬁts if developed
on large tracts. On a national scale, the average yield in value per
unit area is 22 times smaller than that of crops (IBGE, 2009). The
results of this strategy of capital accumulation are found in the low
economic dynamism of Amazonia, where four decades of develop-
ment have destroyed 71.9 million hectares of forest of which only
3.5 million hectares were converted to crops. The vast majority of
the area was destined for grazing at these absurdly low rates of
productivity (EMBRAPA-INPE, 2011).
A consequence of this hoarding of vast areas of idle land
is a shortage of land for most farmers. According to the 2006
agricultural census, which surveyed both declared and undeclared
areas, 95.1 percent of farmers divided among themselves only 11.1
percent of arable territory (IBGE, 2009). Ironically, this fragment
of soil is that which generate the highest rates of production
efﬁciency of Brazilian agriculture. Hoping to avoid the banalities
that such data might provoke, our approach is one that seeks to
show the mechanisms used to rob Brazil and its peasantry of the
land and resources needed to produce and thus to underscore the
relevance of agrarian reform.
The inseparable relationship between land struggle and the
environment
In  Brazil, we  can set aside the inﬂuence of colonial development
and see how the clash of classes in recent history is central to the
formation of the modern state. Even though the results of these
clashes have been positive for landlords, the peasantry has not been
apathetic (Carvalho et al., 2008–2009). While anthropologist Eric
Wolf did not include Brazil in his comparative study of 20th Century
peasant wars (1969), the peasantry’s historical experience in Brazil
relates more to the contemporary revolutions he examines than
to the so-called ‘pre-political’ immobilization expressed by such
critics as Kautsky (1988).
In  view of these clashes, the blossoming of democracy in 1985
can be said to have expressed a reduction of the landlords’ area
of maneuver. The democratic promise of greater equality did not
last, however. Especially during the past ten years, the ruralis-
tas strengthened their hegemony over the superstructure, starting
with the consolidation of their inﬂuence in the legislature (Ribeiro,
2009). Paradoxically, this process coincided with the unprece-
dented rise of an opposition party that has lead the country since
2003. Ironically, it was precisely in this political context that impor-
tant laws were changed, as exempliﬁed by the Brazilian Forestry
Code (Lei 12651/2012).The  ruralistas discursive strategy conditioning the expansion of
arable land to deforestation proved decisive. They made a further
connection between expansion and the imperative of maintain-
ing Brazil’s prominent position in the commodities market. The
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ountry had only recently become number one in exports of var-
ous commodities and in 2008 agribusiness leaders could brag
hat Brazilian production accounted for 5.2 percent of the world
gricultural exports (FAO, 2010). They did not attribute this place-
ent to the aptly deﬁned plunder-model that geographer Harvey
2006) has identiﬁed as crucial to the globalization boom. The
uralista way has been marked by attacking already vulnerable tra-
itional communities, environmental destruction and land market
istortions that have worsened the already precarious position of
any small producers.
In  proportional terms, land concentration in Brazil is worse than
hat of any other country in the world given the fact of the incom-
arable dimensions of Brazil’s land mass. While Brazil’s 0.85 Gini
ndex ranks it sixth worse in terms of land concentration, the top
anking Czech Republic, with an index of 0.92, has only 0.9 percent
f the area that Brazil retains (World Bank, 2010). In fact, there
as at least one landlord in Brazil, Cecílio do Rego Almeida, that
laimed title to a single estate in the Amazon region, the Fazenda
uruá, that at 47,000 km2 was well more than half the size of the
ntire 79,000 km2 Czech Republic.
However, the Fazenda Curuá was only one of many proper-
ies Almeida claimed to own when he died in 2008. The total
rea claimed came to 70,000 km2, which falls within just about
000 km2 of being identical to the size of the entire Czech nation
Câmara, 2001). Even by Brazilian standards, Almeida’s status as
 super-latifundiário attracted suspicion and in the ﬁght over his
state, the legality of his titles was challenged. In 2011, his estate
as stripped of its title to the Fazenda Curuá and his successors did
ot ﬁle a countersuit in time to challenge a judicial decision that
anceled his property after proving in more than 1,500 pages of
ourt proceedings that it was counterfeit (Pinto, 2011). This king of
he land grabbers, whose immortality is guaranteed by the contin-
ed activity of the C. R. Almeida Construction company and the Eco-
odovias toll roads, was only partly dethroned following his death.
While exceptional, the case of the Fazenda Curuá reﬂects a
ractice that is typical, that of forming private property through
he theft of public lands. Through the falsiﬁcation of documenta-
ion and the collaboration of corrupt ofﬁcials, millions of hectares
f state land have been illegally privatized. Amazonia, which corre-
ponds to 49 percent of the Brazilian territory, is the target of a large
hare of this practice today. The alarming rate of grilagem, as the
alsiﬁcation process is called in Brazil, culminated in an investiga-
ion led by the federal legislature that documented various crimes
Câmara, 2001). Instead of penalizing the perpetrators, however,
lected ofﬁcials produced legislation to legalize the practice. Since
009, with the enactment of the Law 11,952, millions of hectares
f inappropriately occupied public land have been recognized as
rivate property through a process of ‘regularization’, effectively
nnulling juridical traditions that had oriented the courts since the
9th Century. Based on this Law 11,952, the government abdicated
ts rights to 67 million hectares of public land in Amazonia. Peas-
nts occupied only around an eighth of this area – some 8.3 million
ectares. Their gain with ‘regularization’ allowed legislators and the
tate to spin a discourse of having advanced agrarian reform goals
y legalizing the land claims of these smallholders, while transfer-
ing the vast majority of the land involved – the remaining 58.7
illion hectares – to large land grabbers. This far more signiﬁcant
onsequence of the law was hardly mentioned (Oliveira, 2010).
These  and still more alarming and violent activities are the ‘dev-
lish details’ that collaborate to place Brazil in the race to the top
f the ranking in the Gini Index for land concentration. Amazon
tates like Pará, where the Fazenda Curuá was located until its dis-
emberment, are also a setting of contemporary rural ‘slave labor’,
f forced land expulsions, murder and threats of murder against
easants and Indigenous peoples, all of it related to land. The clear-
ng of forest to create pasture and particularly the selective cuttingy 36 (2014) 134– 144
of  trees for lumber production promote forced labor analogous to
slavery and these other forms of violence. From 1985 to 2010, 1,033
people have been murdered in land conﬂicts in Amazonia (CPT,
2011), including the spectacular, televised and as yet unresolved
case of the massacre by police of 19 marching landless militants in
Eldorado do Carajás in 1996 (Nepomuceno, 2007).
The violence of man-over-man unfolds side-by-side the vio-
lence of man-over-nature as the human takeover of tropical biomes
unfolds in Brazil. This is where recent changes to the forest code
ﬁt in. For more than a century, with regular updating, the Brazil-
ian Forest Code preserved its standing as one of the world’s more
environmentally advanced laws for balancing conservation inter-
ests with economic development pressures. The reactionary plot to
revise the law started to be sketched-out as proponents discovered
a hypocritical discourse in proposing changes in the name of elim-
inating legal impediments to the development of peasant farms.
It was  argued that the prosecution of environmental crimes spec-
iﬁed in the law would damage peasant interests and thus revising
the law was  necessary to support popular public goals favoring
smallholders. By modifying the law in the name of family farm-
ers, the ruralistas protected themselves against prosecution for
far more extensive crimes of rainforest destruction. The changes
defended granted amnesty to all environmental crimes associated
with deforestation practiced until 2008, absolving not just a few
hundred peasants who  had deforested a few thousand hectares
but a few dozen landlords who  had clear-cut millions of hectares.
There was similar regression on environmental protection param-
eters, which open the way  to increased rates of deforestation, not
to mention the consequent erosion that is bound to damage water
resources. Finally, the code revision eliminated the social concept
of the environment, in which conservation is seen as beneﬁcial to
all, changing it into a matter of individual choice, by establishing
rewards for those who preserve native vegetation. This means that
from now on property owners who invest in preservation will be
compensated under the Law, while those who  ignore it will be able
to buy credits to legitimize environmental destruction, turning con-
servation from a common good into a commodity (Paulino, 2012a;
Sauer and Franc¸ a, 2012).
The  ‘ﬂexibilization’ or transformation of long-lived environ-
mental principles can best be understood as the backlash of an
essentially oligarchic state that has found, in the context of the
neoliberal ideology driving globalization, a discourse for recuper-
ating under cover of apparently modern legislation new ways of
reestablishing mechanisms of social control. In the 1980s, with the
rebirth of democracy, the context itself generated pressures in the
opposite direction to consolidate democracy on the basis of social
struggles that highlighted peasant and environmental concerns,
giving visibility to the need to control deforestation and violence
in the countryside. During the “lost decade” of the 1980s, interna-
tional and domestic concern about the people and environment of
Amazonia reached unprecedented heights (Revkin, 2004). Despite
pressure on the state to generate and enforce pro-labor, pro-
conservation legislation, little was  accomplished that might be seen
as threatening the oligarchic pact (Oliveira, 2010). With the 2012
alteration of the forest code deﬁned as defending peasant interests,
the landlords demonstrated their hegemony and eliminated legal
impediments to perpetuate their social and environmental crimes.
Land concentration at the heart of class alliances
The distribution of political force in Brazil is not the product of a
simple relation between population density and economic weight.
We have noted the rural sector’s success in inﬂuencing policy, for
example. Note that only 15.6 percent of the population lives in the
countryside (IBGE, 2011) and only 6.4 percent of the GDP origi-
nate in agricultural production (CEPEA, 2011). To the contrary, it
e Policy 36 (2014) 134– 144 137
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Table 1
Brazil–Distribution of agricultural establishments in 2006, by metric size and quan-
tity (IBGE, 2009).
Establishment size range Quantity Total area occupied
Landless producers 255,024 0
Less than 10 ha 2,477,071 7,798,607
From 10 to less than 100 ha 1,971,577 62,893,091
From 100 to 1000 ha 424,906 112,696,477
Greater than 1000 ha 46,911 146,553,218
Subtotal 5,175,489 329,941,393
Undeclared area 308,509,731
Urban Area 2,073,700
Water-surface 11,455,300
Indigenous land 125,545,870
squatters might actually have been encouraged to report irregular
holdings. This distinction in the law (see Lei 6383/1976) was meant
to revert a traditionally contrary process of exploiting the work
1 Although various synonyms are used throughout the text for “establishment,”
it  is this term that is used in the census. It covers all forms of farm operation, fromE.T. Paulino / Land Us
eems unequivocal that the more crucial set of relations in capi-
alist societies are to be found in the alliances sustained between
ural landlords and urban entrepreneurs. The rural development
pecialist Cristóbal Kay identiﬁed this relationship in a 2009 article
n rural poverty:
While there are some divergent interests between landlords
and  industrialists these are minor compared to the class con-
ﬂicts  between capitalists and workers. Landlords often invested
in  urban enterprises and urban capitalists acquired landed
properties, generally for social prestige and political reasons,
thereby  facilitating the formation of alliances between them.
[.  . .]  Through forging alliances and common interests land-
lords  and urban capitalists resolved some of the contradictions
between these different fractions of capital so as to maintain
their  dominance over the exploited classes in society (p.113).
In general terms, Kay describe the rural-urban ruling alliance
nd emphasizes its utility in resolving conﬂicts and contradictions
etween agricultural and industrial interests for the purposes of
ccumulation.
For Brazil, the theory of rentier capitalism elucidates the
uances of such alliances, as they arise from a seemingly con-
radictory relationship between an archaic agrarian system and
echnologically advanced sectors of the economy (Martins, 1994;
liveira, 2003). This is exempliﬁed by the case of the Fazenda Curuá,
ith its former owner Almeida having been simultaneously a land
rabber and the owner of the sixth largest construction company
n Brazil (Revista Exame, 2010).
It is not a coincidence that one encounters that same last names
n lists of both large rural property owners and urban commer-
ial, industrial and ﬁnancial businessmen. This comes as little
urprise when we recall that the dictatorship sought to industri-
lize the countryside as part of its strategy to weaken support
or agrarian reform (Gonc¸ alves Neto, 1997). The post-WWII his-
orical context was such that policymakers came to believe that
nly industry could promote economic development and security.
ebates revolved around how agriculture in general and the peas-
ntry in particular could help the industrial sector (Kay, 2009).
he perceived problem was that the agro-export economy, based
s it was on large and inefﬁcient estates – latifúndios, was not
apable of ensuring the provision of adequate raw materials for
ndustry and that the land-starved smallholdings of peasants, called
inifúndio, were too small and inefﬁcient to provide enough cheap
ood for urban workers. In this context, the contradictions of the
omestic market were blamed on the land monopoly represented
y latifundiários, then considered to be the biggest obstacles to
he take-off of industrial capitalism (Solberg, 1987). Land reform
ppeared an unavoidable step in the right direction.
To avoid land reform, the ruralistas allied with the urban
ourgeoisie in proposing public policies that rewarded urban
ntrepreneurs with tax write-offs if they became involved in
overnment-ﬁnanced rural mega-projects, such as dam and road
uilding, electriﬁcation and other infra-structure improvements, as
ell as the construction and management of agro-industrial com-
lexes, such as meatpacking plants, the mills and distilleries built
ince the 1970s to process sugarcane into sugar and ethanol or
actories for transforming eucalyptus into cellulose (Garrido Filha,
980; Martins, 1984; Oliveira, 1990; Gonc¸ alves Neto, 1997). Con-
eived of as integral to the industrialization process, agricultural
odernization justiﬁed the state transfer of vast tracts of public
and to urban entrepreneurs as part and parcel of the development
roject. The arrangement closed a gap between capital and land by
ffering a new avenue for risk-free real estate investments. These
nvestors tended to be a pseudo-bourgeois group that was different
n many ways from the industrial bourgeoisie due to its histori-
al connections to the agro-export economy, as the entrepreneursPublic forest reserves 72,099,864
Total 849,625,858
tended to have accumulated their wealth through service sector
professions, family or personal relationships to the rural economy.
Nevertheless, their identity with the bourgeoisie was unmistak-
able. As part of the civil-military regime, they helped block land
reform with this top-down form of ‘conservative modernization’
that deepened the dualistic model of development traditionally
associated with the Brazilian political economy (Almeida, 2006).
On the one hand, the economy grew at fantastic rates in the early
1970s, on the other, social inequality worsened as wage growth was
suppressed. As one of the 20 largest economies of the world, Brazil
ranks second in inequality and worst when measuring the share
of national wealth held by the poorest 10 percent of the popula-
tion. The majority of the bottom 10 percent lives in the countryside
(OXFAM, 2012).
For  the rural poor, insufﬁcient or non-existent land often deter-
mined one’s fate. According to the most recent agricultural census,
based on 2006 data but published in 2009, the smallest producers
(under 10 ha) have an average farm size smaller than 2.9 ha, while
among the largest landholders the average sized estate is 3124 ha.
For additional comparisons, see Table 1.1
Although the census demonstrates that for each large estate
there are 1092 small ones, observation suggests an even more
asymmetric relationship exists between the number of large and
small farms; the census conﬁrmed this impression by document-
ing such a large quantity of undeclared land under-production.
As Table 1 shows, claims to another 308.5 million hectares went
unidentiﬁed during the census, which is why the census subtotal
of arable land is actually 638.4 million rather than the 329.9 million
hectares formally stated. To account for this huge undeclared area,
the IBGE developed a special category: “areas with other land uses”
(IBGE, 2009).
As  current legislation prescribes, expropriation for agrarian
reform purposes only affects large properties; it can be assumed
that the majority of those who  under-reported their holdings were
landlords seeking to hide data that might have provoked an expro-
priation process.2 Avoiding taxes and prosecution for grilagem are
two other likely motives. For those with agricultural establishments
up to 100 ha in size on public lands, legal mechanisms are available
that promote the normalization of titling processes, such that thesesquatter  smallholdings to large properties or estates.
2 The third chapter of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution is dedicated to the agrarian
reform  policies. Article 186, which is discussed below, establishes the violations
of  usage, environmental or labor laws that can trigger expropriation.
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f peasant families by encouraging them to open farmland on the
rontier only to expel them once the hard work was done with-
ut any form of compensation. But even this law, produced in the
ontext of the dictatorship, stimulated rather than stalled the very
rocess it was meant to correct. The incidence of violent conﬂicts is
ighest in Amazonia precisely due to a struggle to take possession
rom peasants and indigenous peoples of the region’s vast public
orestland by aggressive landlords and their henchmen (Sauer and
lmeida, 2011).
Depending on the composition of political forces at a given
oment, even this undeclared census data could unsettle local
tructures of power. The grileiros are vulnerable to the contradic-
ory need to demonstrate productivity and to hide stolen land.
his vulnerability is perceived by professional entities, which favor
ransparency for technical reasons when it comes to productiv-
ty (Oliveira, 2010). Meanwhile, peasant movements use the same
oncrete information to challenge the productivity of large estates.
igh productivity statistics can suggest hidden areas and the dis-
overy of hidden areas can lower productivity ratios, making it
ossible to restore public lands and force expropriation litigation.
very case is unique, however, because technical innovations can
lso be the source of increased productivity. Since 1975, the aver-
ge yield of the corn quadrupled, that of soybeans doubled and that
f rice tripled (IBGE, 2009).
Brazil’s  productivity index needs to be up-dated to account for
uch innovation but until the present, the ruralistas in congress
nd the Ministry of Agriculture have blocked proposed changes.
n 2006, the Agrarian Development Ministry (MDA, in its Brazilian
cronym) studied the problem and proposed a 30 percent adjust-
ent of indexes. Although such a change would have fallen short of
ccounting for the more dramatic real world increases in produc-
ivity mentioned above, it was seen as a compromise that might
ctually be implemented. However, the articulation of ruralistas
oncentrated in the agriculture ministry pressured against accep-
ance of the measure (Ramos, 2005; Arruda, 2009). In 2010, federal
rosecutors ﬁled suit to force a change in indexes but the case was
till unresolved in 2012 (MPF, 2010). The opposition has used varied
rguments to forestall change but the bottom-line allegedly relates
o traditional fears of what the truth might bring should the rich
nd powerful have to detail their real landholdings. Hence, there
s a need to see the agrarian question in Brazil in its integrity, not
erely as a technical or economic issue, but as a political and social
ne.
Political reasons can be blamed for the government’s failure to
evise the law that regulates the country’s privately owned real
state titling companies (see Lei 10267/2001). These small local
rms are licensed to register and maintain documentation related
o the legal situation of landed property in Brazil. With one or more
f these ﬁrms located in nearly every municipality, the only precise
nformation that exists about the titling of private and consequently
ublic land is completely decentralized. Following Brazil’s histori-
al transition from a centralized monarchy to a federated republic
n 1889, the provinces were assigned the duty of establishing this
roperty registry system and its role in maintaining the power of
he rural oligarchy has become notorious. According to this sys-
em, nearly all the information about land ownership is based on
 supposedly honest owners’ self-declaration and the result is an
mpossible level of data inconsistency and ofﬁcial inertia regarding
erritorial questions (Silva, 1996).
The space between institutional benevolence, misfeasance and
naction is a setting ripe for breaches in the assessment of rural
roperty’s social function. This scenario leaves deep marks on
he territory. Large unproductive estates mean huge swaths of
he country generate little local revenue and employment. The
revalence of absentee-owners means not even the rich landlord
s on hand to support local economies. Thus, land concentrationy 36 (2014) 134– 144
contributes greatly to rural poverty rates. The poverty and lack of
opportunity tear at the social fabric in regions where the industrial
and services sector is not dynamic, because for most of the year
economically active workforce, especially young people, is forced
to abandon the rural communities (Paulino, 2012b). The economies
of thousands of such towns depend on the small monthly pensions
the government has paid retired rural workers and family farm-
ers since the 1970s (Franc¸ a, 2004). Thus, total collapse is contained
by compensatory social policies that, although essential in terms
of immediate needs, do almost nothing to develop the wholesome
independence – the protagonism, if you will – of rural communities.
This socially dysfunctional model is also environmentally dys-
functional, as observed above. Few dare estimate the monetary
value of the long-term damages provoked. The owners or thieves of
these extensive areas tend to extract the most of natural resources
with minimal investment. Acting illegally on at least two levels –
in acquiring the land and in exploiting it – the landlords generate
proﬁts based on predatory practices. It is this logic that explains
the incompatible deforestation rates with the productive use of
land, in which only 4.9 percent of the area deforested in Ama-
zonia had been cropped until 2008 (EMBRAPA-INPE, 2011). Even
when dealing with dedicated, properly titled land, the statistics
are disappointing in terms of productivity and waste. According to
Brazil’s National Food Supply and Nutrition Corporation (CONAB,
in its Brazilian acronym), a unit of the agriculture ministry, only an
estimated that 47.5 million hectares had been cultivated in 2008,
representing only 7.4 percent of Brazil’s arable land (CONAB, 2009).
The World Bank cites a slightly different percentage – 8.1 percent
– because they include permanent crops areas in their calculations
(World Bank, 2010). These signs of extreme idleness in the hege-
monic segment of the agricultural sector stand in striking contrast
to the arguments ruralistas made in the context of altering the
forestry code to expand their right to destroy more and more natu-
ral resources in the name of scarce arable land. It also conﬁrms the
logic of the landless movement in supporting agrarian reform and
in challenging the patriotism, efﬁciency and hegemony of the rural
oligarchy.
The paradoxical productive superiority of peasant
agriculture
In  spite of chronic land insufﬁciencies, peasants have not been
timid in terms of their productivity. Certainly inadequate land
interferes in production patterns, but in relation to landlords,
peasants have shown a remarkable resilience in overcoming this
obstacle. Their secret has been more productive use of the soil
rather than any technical or administrative superiority. Peasants
also make the most of unfavorable natural conditions, such as dis-
advantages in fertility, topography, water resources, and climate, as
well as locational variables that can undermine the income poten-
tial of a farm. These include factors like a peasant unit’s distance
from the market. Because it is cheaper to buy or less visible to
squat on, peasants often work land negatively affected by such poor
conditions.
Despite these observations, the relationship between establish-
ment size and the viability of a holding are not entirely clear. It is
possible to identify patterns from area-based clusters of agrarian
classes. In Brazil, a size classiﬁcation system is used to subdivide
the country’s rural establishments into small, medium and large
categories according to the number of ‘ﬁscal modules’ they con-
tain. Fiscal modules are essentially the land area needed for a farm
operation to be economically viable for one family. They are deﬁned
according to the speciﬁc agricultural conditions in each munici-
pality, and thus vary in size between 5 and 110 ha. Thus, a small
classiﬁcation is given to those establishments that have 4 modules
E.T. Paulino / Land Use Polic
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in unemployment in a country already torn asunder by endemicig. 1. Brazilian agricultural indicators according to establishment size (in hectares),
eﬁned as a percentage of all declared and undeclared arable land (IBGE, 2009).
r less, those up to 15 modules are considered medium-sized farms
nd those that surpass this level are deﬁned as large units.
In  order to reconcile the vast diversity made possible by this clas-
iﬁcation system with indicators drawn from the 2006 agricultural
ensus, some different relationships between size and class were
sed here. Small is deﬁned as an establishment with up to 50 ha and
arge properties are those with more than 1000 ha. The intermedi-
te ranges are less precise, because depending on the region, values
etween 50 and 200 ha can cover both small and medium holdings,
hile the 200 to 1000 ha range can correspond to both the medium
nd large properties. For this reason, a comparative approach based
n the two extremes of a three-class system was chosen to estab-
ish parameters for Brazil’s total agricultural area, which is sum of
oth the declared and undeclared areas in Table 1. For purposes
f comparison, some major agricultural indicators have been asso-
iated with the new size categories in the single graph in Fig. 1.
t groups data on animal and vegetable production, subsidies and
mployment obtained in the ﬁeld, as shown below.
Fig. 1 shows the inverse relationship between properties size
nd favorable economic indicators, such as employment gener-
tion and revenue production. Another interesting contradiction
s shown in the contrast between performance and agricultural
ubsidies, with large establishments receiving signiﬁcantly more
ubsidized (low-interest) credit than smallholdings, despite their
uch lower performance in terms of employment and revenue
eneration. The most outstanding success of smallholders is in job
reation. With only 6.9 percent of arable land, small farms employ
4.6 percent of the countryside’s economically active population,
hile large farms with more than 20 percent of the land employ
nly 5.8 percent of this population.
Regarding rural employment, it helps to consider qualitative
spects of rural work. The inﬂux of green revolution technologies
nd of the more recent wave of genetic technologies has tended to
oth reduce the number of jobs available and increase the tem-
orary nature of rural work. While mechanization is one of the
eading changes affecting these trends, it has tended to improve
he quality of work for few people. Using sugarcane as an example,
ane-cutting machines do the work of 100–150 manual cutters at
uch faster rates and at much less cost in human drudgery. This is
urely an achievement both capitalists and socialists can celebrate
s a step forward toward the “kingdom of liberty” (Marx, 1996).
But  it is neither the beginning, nor the end of this journey. In
he ﬁrst place, employers used the machines to displace cane cut-
ers without any consideration for their lost work and income. For
hose ﬁelds as yet unprepared for machine production, manual cane
utting continued, now under pressure to compete with rates of
roduction set by machines. Working conditions worsened dra-
atically as individual tonnage quotas jolted upward from threey 36 (2014) 134– 144 139
to  ten tons a day. A surplus of workers as well as deskilling made it
possible to drop pay scales while intensifying an already exhausting
labor regime. It happened that the principle of expanded accumu-
lation, founded on surplus value extraction, not only concentrated
beneﬁts in the hands of owners, but promoted regression for human
existence in the dimension Marx called the “kingdom of necessity,”
because the possibility of selling one’s labor is inversely propor-
tional to one’s technical resources, an insight valid not only for the
agricultural sector of the economy.
In terms of job creation, small farms offer an additional differen-
tial that Fig. 1 does not fully capture. One can infer the participation
of family labor in the overall labor force engaged in agriculture. In
fact, we  know that 77.3 percent of rural employment is composed
of the family members of those responsible for the production unit.
This ﬁnding adds detail to the graph by demonstrating that most
rural workers are actually relatives of small establishment opera-
tors, while family members are also provide a signiﬁcant proportion
of the labor on medium and large establishments, where family is
involved with production and above all, business administration.
The  relationship between small land size and elevated job-
generation can be understood through Alexander Chayanov’s
consumption-labor-balance theory (1974). In the 1920s, the Rus-
sian agronomist sought to understand peasant resilience in the
face of their disadvantaged place in the capitalist system. Chayanov
developed a theory of “non-capitalist economic systems” to arrive
at his conclusions. While in the capitalist mode of production,
entrepreneurs determined their labor needs according to the avail-
ability of resources such as ﬁnancing, land and machinery, for the
peasantry, the “non-capitalist” theory demonstrated that repro-
ductive needs determined labor demand. In this system, peasants
adjusted their economic activity in accordance with the necessity of
family preservation without regard to material resources. In other
words, if for the capitalist mode the parameter is the productivity
of the business, for the peasant mode it is the re-productivity of
the family. This implies divergent set of directives. For the capital-
ist enterprise, maximizing proﬁts through the labor theory of value
puts a premium on suppressing labor costs by lowering wages and
increasing the self-reliance of workers, forcing them to cover the
costs of their reproduction. For the peasant enterprise, the ability
to pay the costs of reproduction is the top priority, placing empha-
sis on the health and nutrition of family members. The dynamics
of small farms are better understood through this “non-capitalist”
theory, whereas medium and large farms are best explained by
capitalist logic. Medium and large farms don’t create many jobs
because proﬁtability is privileged. Small farms create more jobs
because human needs are their ﬁrst priority.
According to sociologist Ploeg (2008), the peasant tradition
is founded on enhancing production efﬁciency though a process
of establishing control over knowledge-oriented tools and tech-
niques, contrary to the capitalist system’s emphasis on increasing
proﬁts by standardizing goods for the market in homogenization
processes. The efﬁciencies that result for peasants arise from the
speciﬁc conditions of each unit of production, naturally reprodu-
cing this diversity. For Ploeg (2008), this tradition is at the root of the
re-peasantization processes unfolding in Europe and other parts of
the world. In Brazil, the peasant recreation process is riddled with
contradictions (Oliveira, 2003; Shanin, 2008), chief among them a
slight increase in the share of family farm labor, rising from 76.9 to
77.3 percent of total rural jobs between 1996 and 2006, accompa-
nied by a dramatic decrease of nearly 1 million family occupations
during the same period (Fernandes et al., 2012).
The disturbing decline in farm employment – like any increaseunderemployment – calls for immediate corrective measures.
Declining rural jobs can be explained by the advance of modern
technologies in conventional agriculture as well as land grabbing
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ecause each of these trends reduces opportunities for the pro-
uctive employment of labor by either monopolizing control over
he land, preventing it from being used, or by overusing land and
ater resources in ways that negatively affect the regenerative
echanisms of nature, arguably agriculture’s greatest ally. The best
trategy for counteracting this situation would be agrarian reform,
ividing the land into smaller establishments by implementing
xisting policies and creating new ones to ensure smallholder
ncomes. Such measures would be oriented by a long-range view
f territorial development based on enhanced and expanded farm
mployment, improvement in land tenure arrangements, environ-
ental sustainability, and a safer and more abundant supply of
ood.
Obviously, such a proposal represents a complete inversion of
he perspective currently guiding agriculture policies in Brazil. But
he logic of such a change in policies is irrefutable when one looks
losely at the data reﬂected in Fig. 1. While large establishments
eceived 43.6 percent of funds, mostly in the form of subsidized
oans, they contributed only 24.8 percent of production value. In
ontrast, small farms received only 23.3 percent of these funds
hile producing 41 percent of agricultural value In terms of area,
he statistics reveal yet another striking productive efﬁciency of
mall farms. Controlling just 6.9 percent of agricultural land, estab-
ishments with up to 50 ha produced nearly double the amount
enerated by establishments with more than 1000 ha, even though
hese control more than three times the area. In terms of money,
he 2006 agricultural census veriﬁed that the gross per hectare rev-
nue obtained by smallholders was US$ 625.60 compared to US$
14.12 earned by large establishments. Thus, the more vulnerable
egment of the sector, the smallholders who receive only half the
mount of subsidies and control less than one-third the quantity of
and as compared to large holders, were ﬁve and a half times more
fﬁcient in terms of production value, which is the least subjective
f various types of comparative statistics. Investing more in this
egment could only improve Brazil’s agricultural performance, not
o mention its employment statistics and, consequently, nearly all
ocio-economic indicators.
Whether  or not our argument is logical from a socioeconomic
erspective, political complications need to be taken into consider-
tion (Solberg, 1987). The rentier pact that favors ruralistas has led
he Brazilian government to use a conceptual distinction consis-
ent with the thesis of the economic infeasibility of smallholding.
or the purpose of public policy, the government distinguishes
etween two general classiﬁcations of agricultural establishments:
amily farms and commercial farms. To determine an establish-
ent’s category, the government uses data relative to the size of
ts area and origin of its labor force, but not its productivity. In
 separate process, largely determined by congress, budgets are
stablished for each harvest year with credit subsidies determined
or each classiﬁcation. For the 2012/2013 year, US$ 58 billion was
et aside for the commercial class and US$ 9 billion for the family
ategory. Thus, without any reference to production, employment
r efﬁciency, only 13.5 percent of the budget was destined to
upport the most populous and productive segment of Brazilian
arms.
All small farms certainly are not efﬁcient and all large establish-
ents are neither inefﬁcient not unproductive. The poster children
f agribusiness in Brazil are plantations growing soybeans or sugar
ane, monocultures that together account for 42.3 percent of the
ultivated area (IBGE, 2009). Efﬁcient they may  be, but most of them
mploy few people, poison the soil, pollute the water supply and
timulate erosion, causing springs to dry-up and rivers to choke-off.
entralized management, genetic engineering and artiﬁcial toxic
ngredients may  simplify operations and produce short-term efﬁ-
iency, but the long-term environmental costs are much debated
Oliveira, 2003; Bombardi, 2011).y 36 (2014) 134– 144
Territorial uses and abuses in the context of the rentier pact
Consistent  with the logic of privatizing proﬁts and socializing
losses, the favoritism shown larger estates and monocultures repre-
sents a process of restoring the economic dominance of the primary
sector. Far from being imposed geopolitically by the central pow-
ers or even the result of anonymous global forces, such as those
emphasized by Hardt and Negri (2000), this return to plantation
society in Brazil arises from structural changes promoted by the
hegemonic group of agrarian elites within the dominant classes.
The names and faces of these actors are recognizable to those who
staff the state apparatus indispensable to the success of capitalist
accumulation, even while its partisanship apparently promotes the
weakening of the capitalist system.
Despite the potential to advance a development plan capa-
ble of reconciling economic, social and environmental demands
in Brazil, the emphasis of public policy has been on unrestrained
accumulation, to the point of strengthening both productive and
unproductive rural estates. The productive latifúndia are called
agribusinesses if they can be identiﬁed with “modern” produc-
tion techniques. These compress the time of accumulation while
almost always placing at risk social and environmental resources.
These activities bear little relationship to agriculture, which is a
concept as broad as culture, in which life is reproduced where
diverse and plural territorial practices prevail (Gonc¸ alves, 2006;
Desmarais, 2007). It is in this fundamental distinction between
agriculture as culture and agriculture as accumulation that we
can ﬁnd opportunities to expand practices that contribute to the
consolidation of sovereignty in food production and technologi-
cal innovation (Altieri and Toledo, 2011; Borras and Franco, 2012;
Wittman, 2011).
Although numerically superior to latifundia, peasant estab-
lishments are not completely associated with the sustainability
paradigm. There are two  reasons main for this. First, the amount of
land they control is too small to serve as the basis of an overarch-
ing paradigm shift. Second, the attraction of modern technological
ﬁxes is so hegemonic, that few farmers value agro-ecological
approaches, preferring to adopt the latest genetic, chemical or
mechanical innovation they can afford to adopt. The ﬁrst item is
documented in Table 1; the second is revealed in pesticide con-
sumption statistics, which indicate that usage averages 3.7 kg of
pesticides per hectare (Palma, 2011). This estimate easily places
Brazil ﬁrst in the world in pesticide usage, considering that the area
under cultivation that year greatly overwhelmed the 165.6 mil-
lion hectares harvested that year by the United States, which was
in second-place using far fewer chemicals (World Bank, 2010). In
the 2006 census, all large establishments reported using pesticides,
whereas nearly half (48.2 percent) of small farms reported pesti-
cide use (IBGE, 2009). This suggests that the majority of Brazilian
peasants (51.8 percent) are putting into practice sustainable culti-
vation techniques advocated by organizations such as the Landless
Workers Movement (MST, in its Brazilian acronym) to promote an
alternative paradigm to that of agrarian capitalism (Fernandes et al.,
2012).
Many researchers monitor the impacts of pesticides on Brazilian
society (Stoppelli and Magalhães, 2005; Ibama, 2010; Bombardi,
2011). It has been observed that the problem manifests itself
more severely in monoculture regions, such as the state of Mato
Grosso, where soybean plantations predominate. A Federal Uni-
versity of Mato Grosso study involving 65 lactating mothers in the
municipality of Lucas de Rio Verde – a major soybean producing
center – showed that all of these women had pesticide residuessubstances. The same study revealed that in a single year, soy-
bean farmers applied 136.4 l of pesticide per municipal inhabitant
(Palma, 2011).
e Polic
m
i
u
“
m
i
t
i
c
a
p
l
d
o
v
l
T
s
s
n
b
w
a
i
f
m
o
d
r
i
t
r
l
o
g
s
t
ﬁ
W
d
m
I
i
o
h
“
t
o
l
w
i
o
t
a
i
d
o
l
t
i
i
r
eE.T. Paulino / Land Us
To sum up, what has been taken to be the modern agricultural
odel has shown itself to be unsustainable, not only by triggering
mmeasurable environmental damages – and contradictorily stim-
lating yet another market for investment, as in the controversial
cap-and-trade” emissions control exchanges – but also by pro-
oting profound harm to human health, among other anti-social
lls. Both the excessive use of poisons to intensify productivity and
he extensive occupation of virgin land could not have prospered
n Brazil without a powerful propaganda campaign designed, of
ourse, to reveal beneﬁts and conceal costs (Bruno, 2009). Coercion
nd cooptation were also exploited to implant the system, as in
rosecuting some farmers for not paying royalties to corporations
ike Monsanto when genetically modiﬁed (GMO) seeds accidently
rifted onto their land, while providing government subsidies to
thers for willfully using such seed. From the ideological point of
iew, the strategy has been to represent large estates using the
atest conventional technology as models of agricultural success.
herefore, images, expressions, speeches, and actions have empha-
ized their supposed attributes of economic efﬁciency and even
ustainability as a way consolidating the hegemony of the agribusi-
ess paradigm. The campaign has swayed public opinion to accept
ourgeois repudiation of peasant struggle for land and has greatly
eakened support for enforcing the constitution’s agrarian reform
rticles.
In terms of political confrontations that could result in establish-
ng some constraints on ruralistas, inﬂuencing their ability to proﬁt
rom land, the points of debate are exaggerated: either develop-
ent or preservation, food or forest, often ignoring the possibility
f compatibility between diverse goals. The level of peasant pro-
uctivity indicated above suggests that the rational use of the soil
equires redistribution, hence an aggressive agrarian reform pol-
cy. They also suggest that such a measure would greatly increase
he food supply. Environmental beneﬁts and sustainability would
esult, in the ﬁrst instance, from having less land under the plow,
ess forest destroyed–maybe none–to produce more food. In a sec-
nd phase, the government could reduce its support for green and
enetic revolution models and invest more in agroecology, bringing
till more overall societal beneﬁts. Many believe the agrarian capi-
alism model to be a purposefully incorrect interpretation of reality
tting of a country in which the “settling of scores” has yet to occur.
ithout access to a decent educational system that might open
oors to transformative scientiﬁc knowledge about the world, the
ajority falls prey to a hegemonic order that impedes their growth.
deological manipulation is fertile where citizenship is fragile. Such
s Brazil’s story.
In  1994, in the midst of Brazil’s redemocratization process, soci-
logist José de Souza Martins elaborated on the concept of “slow
istory” to describe the persistence of the backward in Brazil’s
country of the future” mindset. He laid the blame for this con-
radiction, this hopeful waiting for a progress that is always just
ver the horizon, on the durability of the alliance fused between
andlords and capitalists, a double-edged sword wielded against
orkers by planters become urban entrepreneurs and industrial-
sts become farmers. Instead of opposition between these segments
f the ruling class, only the origins of their wealth distinguish
hem – land rents or production proﬁts – while their thirst to
ccumulate is nearly identical. These are the distinct character-
stics of rentier capitalism (Martins, 1994). There is a structural
ifference between rentier and industrial capitalism that has its
rigins in the bourgeoisie’s victorious struggle against the land-
ord’s monopoly control over land rents, as this practice is said
o have interfered with rates of capital accumulation, tending to
ncrease the cost of reproducing the workforce. In rentier cap-
talism, the burden of land rents tends to fade away, gradually
eplaced by the beneﬁts of landownership, such as increased
quity.y 36 (2014) 134– 144 141
There are other beneﬁts, as well. One comes from the patri-
monial value of land that allows title-holders to obtain subsidized
credit for loans related to agricultural activity. Another stems from
the privileged tax status of agricultural land that makes it a good
place to protect one’s capital. The rentier orientation of tax policy
keeps rates on idle land so low that there is little incentive to work it.
The only tax on farm property is the Rural Territorial Tax (ITR, in its
Brazilian acronym), previously discussed. It is so low that landown-
ers pay less tax on rents than workers pay on their salaries. In 2012,
property owners will pay a little more than US$291.3 million in
ITR. This is equivalent to about 0.2 percent of the total amount to
be paid nationally on property values and rents. In the meantime,
salaried employees will have to pay the equivalent of 8.7 percent
of this value (CGU, 2012). In deference to the power of ruralistas,
even urban property owners pay more and there are absolutely no
mechanisms for progressively modifying these disparities. In 2012,
for example, the value of the corresponding property tax to be paid
only by urban land owners in the city of São Paulo is more than US
$2.6 billion, some nine times the amount to be paid by the rural
landowners in the entire country (PMSP, 2012).
These facts turn the paragraphs of the Brazilian Constitution that
discuss property’s social function into a rhetorical masterpiece of
romantic writing. According to article 184, “it falls within the com-
petence of the federal government to expropriate for purposes of
agrarian reform, rural properties that fail to fulﬁll their social func-
tion.” In article 186, a property’s “social function” is only fulﬁlled
when it is “rationally and adequately utilized,” “natural resources
are adequately utilized and the environment preserved,” “labor
relations laws are observed,” and its use “favors the well-being of
owners and workers.” Practically speaking, the state should guar-
antee the “social function” of farmland through tax mechanisms,
constantly regulating property rights, such that no one assumes
they are “absolute.” This failure of the New Republic to stop the
cycle of wealth concentration through the accumulation of private
property maintains a tradition of natural resource underutilization
that has characterized Brazil since the initial extractive cycle of the
colonial era.
The  fact that the land is an irreproducible good explains the
valuation process. So long as society’s demand for food increases,
land prices would tend to increase in any private property regime.
In situations of oligopoly, however, society is forced to pay more in
order to induce landlords to put their land into production. The rate
of proﬁt from the land is what will determine the type of use owners
opt to establish, whether they themselves cultivate it, transfer the
right of use to others, or do nothing until the rate of return climbs
again (Solberg, 1987).
Between  2000 and 2006, the average price of arable land in
Brazil increased 161 percent, discounting for inﬂation. Although
global phenomena such as heightened demand for agrofuels and
commodity price appreciation contributed to this trend, the price
inﬂation in Brazil was  signiﬁcantly higher than it was for arable
land in the United States, which increased in value by 92.9 percent
between 2000 and 2007 (Gasques et al., 2008). Some local cases
are even more striking. In Paraná State, land prices rose 450 per-
cent between 2000 and 2011. In 2011, the average hectare cost
US$8863.02 (SEAB, 2012), nearly 53 percent higher than the aver-
age price of a hectare in the United States as recorded that year by
the USDA (US$5,807.090).
Such  high land prices make the reproduction of small produc-
tion units increasingly difﬁcult. As Chayanov (1974) related in the
1920s, the demographic dynamics of family farming make the
expansion of cultivated area a necessity due to the formation of new
families with the arrival of children to adulthood. Faced with the
near impossibility of buying land at current prices, youth have few
choices but to leave the countryside – a phenomenon that threat-
ens the fragile balance between land and labor that is essential for
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uaranteeing the supply of staples, crops which are rarely grown by
edium to large establishments as they tend to be more perishable
nd less remunerative than the monocultures cited above.
Contrasting smallholder income with hourly wage rates is one
dditional parameter for calculating the challenges facing peasants
hen they consider land acquisitions. In Paraná state in 2011, the
inimum hourly wage was US$1.52. At this rate, a hectare of land
n the state would require around 5830 h of work. In the U.S., where
he minimum hourly wage was US$7.25, the same amount of land
t the lower U.S. average price would require 801 h of labor. While
he intrinsic qualities of a fraction of Brazilian soil may  inﬂuence
rice differentials, they interfere little in the country’s dramatic
and market trends; what explains these, before any other cause,
re the twists and turns of maintaining the rentier pact. This is
anifest in capitalized income; that is to say, in land price hikes
hat result from the rural real estate market.
onclusion
The legal changes regarding “agricultural development” that the
uralistas have manipulated through congress, such as the revised
orest code, collide violently with nearly all the evidence. The defor-
station of Amazonia is a distinct example since the region became
 target of expropriation by capitalists only in the 1970s, when
he dictatorship began to implement policies to consolidate its
integration” into the national political economy. It is important
o emphasize that the state-induced integration was to be a capi-
alist one, since over 180 different indigenous nations already lived
n the region, having escaped genocide by moving inland ahead of
he advancing European occupation of coastal zones since the colo-
ial era. Thereafter, various peasant incursions affected the region
s poor rural Brazilians sought opportunities to settle in the vast
pen territory. Although these spontaneous episodes of population
rowth obviously jeopardized Amazonia’s original vegetation, the
ar more devastating occupation of the region by mining compa-
ies, agro-industrial complexes and agribusiness is a more recent
henomenon.
The prior history of the region is important to note as it under-
cores the fact that the area had experienced sustainable forms
f development and that Amazonia was not a human void before
he 1970s, in contradistinction to government propaganda. If there
as a void, it was an accumulation void, because self-sustaining
ettlements dotted the region through a centuries-long process of
ccupation. Even earlier attempts to stimulate capitalist accumu-
ation in the region, such as the so-called rubber boom at the turn
f the 20th century, was far more agro-ecological than contem-
orary forms of exploitation. Workers obtained natural rubber by
apping Hevea brasiliensis sap; for almost half century, this native
ree supplied industrial revolution demand for this new raw mate-
ial. The boom turned bust with competition from Malaysian rubber
ree plantations that were easier for capitalists to control than the
omplex Amazon forest routes tappers designed to collect rubber
rom trees cultivated in their native habitat. When demand slowed,
hose accustomed to life in the forest stayed on, developing other
xtractive activities that sustained communities without the need
o generate a cash economy or land market (Revkin, 2004).
In  contrasting the compatibility of these traditional activities
ith the incompatibility of the rentier model in the Amazon biome,
he major expression of this model is deforestation. Negligible
uantities of forest were destroyed until the 1970s. From then
ntil 2008, capitalists eliminated 71.9 million hectares of forest,
hich is equivalent to 77.3 percent of the total area of the three
ountries – the Netherlands, Germany and France – that are, like
he United States, individually ahead of Brazil in the value of agri-
ultural exports (FAO, 2010). Adding to the sense of tragedy thisy 36 (2014) 134– 144
fact  that, if one were to unite the territorial dimensions of these
same three countries, the combined area would be equivalent to
only 11 percent of Brazil’s territory and yet, the combined value of
their agricultural exports typically exceeds those of Brazil by nearly
400 percent (FAO, 2010).
Obviously,  area is not the only factor that matters. In contrasting
Brazil’s place in the ranking of agro-export nations, it is also impor-
tant to note climatic factors. The top four countries are all in the
northern hemisphere where only a single annual cereals harvest
is possible. Brazil is again privileged in this sense since conditions
of sunshine, rainfall, temperature, altitude and topography allow
the country to have two  cereal harvests a year, mostly without
irrigation or burdensome production techniques. Therefore, given
all of Brazil’s enormous geographical advantages, its ﬁfth position
in the commodities market expressed in exportation values repre-
sents more its failings than successes.
Another standard of comparison is the Gini index on land
concentration. Despite a decrease of 0.03 percent compared to a
benchmark value established in 1985, this index should also be ana-
lyzed for what it conceals as well as what it reveals. The reduction
in the concentration of land should be considered in the context of
the two largest programs of land “decentralization” in the country’s
history: the ﬁrst and second national agrarian reform plans (PNRA,
in their Brazilian acronym). The ﬁrst, initiated in 1986 at the begin-
ning of the re-democratization process, anticipated the settlement
of a million families. The second, organized following the inaugu-
ration as president in 2003 of the former metalworkers leader Luis
Inacio Lula da Silva, reafﬁrmed the necessity to keep the goal of
settling a million families because only 6 percent of that goal had
been achieved by the ﬁrst plan.
However, the process of building alliances to both gain election
and govern led Lula and the ﬁrst popular government in Brazil-
ian history to abandon the quantitative parameters and reposition
itself in relation to the structural reform project that had seemingly
brought the Workers Party (PT, in its Brazilian acronym) to power.
Thus, the goal of the second PNRA was  reduced to 400 thousand
families. Upon reﬂection, achieving this much-reduced goal would
have been a great advance for agrarian reform since, even by the
end of Lula’s second four year term of ofﬁce, only 162,387 fami-
lies had been settled (Oliveira, 2010). Ofﬁcial statements, however,
claim higher numbers in order to support the argument that the PT
administered the biggest land reform project in Brazilian history
(INCRA, 2011). To support this claim, the government defends a
change of nomenclatures as a land reform conquest. In other words,
more than two-thirds of those settled according to ofﬁcial statistics
essentially were those whose holdings were “regularized” through
formal titling, as addressed above in discussing Law 11,952 of 2009.
By calling land title normalization agrarian reform, the government
tripled the number of families settled, even though the vast major-
ity of these families were on land that effectively belonged to them
already. This speaks to a struggle in Brazil over the deﬁnition of
agrarian reform. For some, it is assistance of any form to small
family farmers; for others, especially those linked to popular orga-
nizations like the MST, reform only occurs when private or public
lands are redistributed to peasant families.
Moreover, from 2003 to 2010 the budget set-aside to purchase
land for agrarian reform did not privilege the constitutional mech-
anism of expropriation, as had been the norm since the end of
the 1980s. Some 40.4 million hectares were bought for agrarian
reform purposes and yet part of this stockpiling has yet to be
distributed to workers because the settlement creation process is
practically paralyzed due to ruralista intransigence within the gov-
ernment (Paulino, 2012b). When analyzing the disbursement of
land for agrarian reform purposes in the state of Sergipe, during
the period from 2008 to 2010, a geographer identiﬁed that 92.6 per-
cent of the resources were destined to land acquisition, leaving only
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.4 percent to spend on infrastructure, such as building roads, sup-
lying drinking water, energy, housing and similar investments
Pereira, 2012).
While  the federal government has justiﬁed land purchases as a
ay of streamlining the settlement creation process, arguing that
t takes far too long to ﬁght in the courts to take-back land illegally
bsconded from public areas, the fact is that the state lacks the
olitical will needed to dismantle the land grabbing schemes that
esulted in privatizing lands that should in fact be used for agrarian
eform projects without any burden on public coffers. The gaps in
ccounting for the ownership of national territory that appeared in
he census of 2006 are a good indicator of the government’s fear
o publicize the issue as a means to socially construct a solution.
or this reason alone, the situation is bound to worsen, because
he strategy of privileging purchase over expropriation, not only
ncumber public funds and reduce the budget share available to
nvest in the infrastructure needed to make settlements viable,
t also makes the state appear to grileiros as a realtor of unparal-
eled magnitude. In a vicious cycle, stimulating the conversion of
and into a proﬁtable business, the state actually promotes illegal
and grabbing and land concentration. This, in turn, adds to the
uralistas source of power to act behind the scenes in government
orridors in order to perpetuate and enhance ministerial practice
hat favors the proﬁtability of the land market. From this pressure
omes this obscure yet dramatic shift in policy privileging land pur-
hases in detriment to exercising the constitutional prerogative of
xpropriation for agrarian reform purposes (Castilho, 2012).
It  is not only land governance policy that concerns large
andowners, but those policies that favor the allocation of land to
easants, since agrarian reform effectively takes settlement land
ut of the ﬂux and ﬂow of the market, thereby affecting their pro-
ts. It is for no other reason that a supposedly temporary executive
rder signed by President Cardoso during his last years in ofﬁce
as remained on the books for more than a decade. According to
he order numbered 2183-56, issued in 2001, expropriation pro-
esses on lands occupied by peasants organized to struggle for land
re to be suspended automatically for two years even if the land
n question has been illegally taken by its title holder or found in
iolation of the social function criteria of the constitution. The pro-
ess suspension period can be extended indeﬁnitely should new
ccupations occur. This is one reason for a signiﬁcant decline in
and occupations, this once tried and true method of speeding the
mplementation of land reform. It explains part of the reason for a
ecrease in the number of landless worker camps along the high-
ays since 2005. Once an effective organizing strategy as well as
 prominent public relations tool, now those who  participate in
ccupations can be indeﬁnitely excluded from being registered as
ossible beneﬁciaries of agrarian reform. They may  also face crimi-
al charges for participating in “criminal gangs,” as the MST  is often
haracterized.
While the difﬁculties in achieving ofﬁcial agrarian reform goals
ould have been converted into political capital, the state chose not
ust to ignore but to deepen the criminalization of one of the largest
ocial struggles of the contemporary era, one which simply sought
o transform into reality the dreamed about ideal of the poor and
arginalized to guarantee a life of productive labor on a humble
arcel of Brazilian soil. Instead of turning a demand for basic condi-
ions of survival of the underclasses into hope, the state helped turn
he precarious condition of the majority into a weapon of coercion
nd fragmentation. Instead of land, the poor received the “Family
urse”(Bolsa Família), a program designed not to enhance indepen-
ence and self-determination but dependence and control, not to
obilize the creative forces and human capacity of the Brazilian
eople, but just its opposite through a monthly payout of approx-
mately US$58 per family (CNSAN, 2010). The program may  have
ositively inﬂuenced Brazil’s poverty statistics by producing somey 36 (2014) 134– 144 143
of the highest rates of reduction in poverty indices in the world, but
it has done nothing to end chronic dependency.
In 2010, the last year of Lula’s presidency, the government allo-
cated US$8.6 billion dollars to this program, equivalent to only 14.4
percent of the amount spent to subsidize commercial agriculture
(CGU, 2012). The purpose of this comparison is not to belittle the
importance of the Family Purse Program in the lives of the poor.
Indeed, the program’s importance to the under privileged can be
measured in inverse proportion to the repudiation it has received
from the bourgeoisie, not to mention certain segments of the mid-
dle class who hate it for making it more difﬁcult to demean and
exploit workers otherwise trapped in the informal circuits of the
economy. The purpose of this example is to heighten attention to
the policy changes that were implemented, while more profound
and potentially transformative structural changes were swept out
of sight by a political party that had long manifested support for
redistributive agrarian reform. The growing ability of landlords to
beneﬁt from land governance policies and the growing dependence
of the poor on welfare deepen the contradictions that serve as pow-
erful obstacles to emancipation.
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